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Abstract
Several regulatory authorities worldwide have imposed forward contract commitments on
electricity producers as a way to mitigate their market power. In order to understand the e¤ects
of such commitments, we introduce forward contracting in a uniform-price auction model with
complete information and discrete bids. The model predicts that forward contracts are generally
pro-competitive, but might have anti-competitive e¤ects whenever awarded to rms with little
but yet some market power. Furthermore, an increase in contract volume may not always be pro-
competitive. Our analysis suggests that forward contracts should be allocated so as to (virtually)
reduce asymmetries across rms.
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1 Introduction
Concerns over the exercise of market power in electricity markets have led several competition and
regulatory authorities to impose forward contract commitments on the dominant producers.1 Such
contracts have taken various forms, but they all have one important feature in common: they commit
producers to receiving a xed price for a certain fraction of their output before wholesale market
competition takes place. The vesting contractsintroduced at privatization in the British electricity
market or the Competition Transition Costsfor stranded costs recovery in Spain, provide two well-
known examples of such forward commitments.2 More recently, several regulators worldwide have
been forcing large electricity producers to auction o¤virtual power plants(VPPs), which essentially
work as forward sales. VPPs have also been used as antitrust remedies in several competition policy
cases, including merger control proceedings and abuse of dominance investigations.3 More generally,
several authors have blamed the poor performance of some electricity markets on the lack of su¢ cient
forward contracting, and propose to foster it for these markets to deliver e¢ cient outcomes (Wolak
(2007b) and Bushnell et al. (2008)).
In this paper we investigate how such forward contract commitments a¤ect rmsbidding be-
haviour and equilibrium outcomes in electricity markets.4 As compared to the no-contracts case,
forward contracts can potentially result in higher prices if su¢ ciently many forward contracts are
awarded to rms with little but yet some market power. However, such anti-competitive e¤ects
never arise whenever contracts are awarded to the dominant rm in the market. Therefore, the
relevant question is how to allocate forward contracts among rms to avoid their potential anti-
competitive e¤ects while enhancing the pro-competitive ones. In this respect, the current paper
provides a clear policy answer: forward contracts should be awarded in ways that align all rms
interests by (virtually) reducing their asymmetries.
Our analysis is based on a multi-unit uniform-price auction model with complete information,
which reects important institutional and structural features of electricity markets. Firstly, rms
compete by submitting supply functions with a nite number of steps, as it is virtually the case in
all multi-unit auctions in practice; secondly, rms own a portfolio of several production technologies,
thus giving rise to (weakly) increasing marginal cost functions that might di¤er across rms; and
thirdly, rms are allowed to hold exogenously given forward contracts, which are nancially settled
once the market closes.5
1Market power concerns in electricity markets have also fostered the establishment and promotion of forwards
markets, as in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland market (PJM) or in the Australian National Electricity Market.
However, these are not the subject of this paper to the extent that participation in such markets is typically voluntary
and hence endogenous.
2See Wolfram (1999) for a description of the rst, and Fabra and Toro (2005) and Kühn and Machado (2006) for
a description of the second.
3For instance, VPPs have been used in the mergers cases EDF/EnBW in 2000 and Nuon/Reliant in 2003, in the
alleged price-squeeze case involving EDF/Direct Energy in 2007, or in the abuse of dominance by ENEL in 2006. In
Spain and Portugal, VPPs have also been used in an attempt to make the market more competitive. For a description
and analysis of VPPs, see Schultz (2007) and Federico and López (2009).
4Such contractual arrangements encompass several types of vertical commitments, including vertical integration.
To the extent that they can be considered to be exogenous (Bushnell et al. (2008)), our paper also sheds light on their
e¤ects.
5Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004) also study auctions where bidders have exogenously given forward contracts. How-
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Despite the complexity of the problem, we show that all the equilibria have a simple pattern: all
rms but one (referred to as non-price-setters) behave as price-takers, i.e., they bid at marginal costs
or use any other outcome-equivalent strategy,6 while the remaining rm (referred to as the price-
setter) sets the price at the level that maximizes its prots over the residual demand. Therefore, there
are as many candidate equilibrium outcomes as rms in the market, which di¤er in the identity of
the price-setter. If rms are asymmetric, some of such candidate equilibria might not be sustainable:
a non-price-setter might prefer to become the price-setter at a higher price if the price increase more
than compensates for its output loss. In any event, equilibrium existence is guaranteed as no rm
wants to deviate from the highest price candidate equilibrium.
In this context, forward contracts impact equilibrium prices through two channels: the change
in the price-setters prot-maximizing price, and the change in the non-price-settersdeviation in-
centives. On the one hand, the price-setters prot-maximizing price is lower with contracts given
that market prices only a¤ect its uncovered sales. On the other hand, a lower price also makes it
more attractive for a non-price-setter to deviate to a higher price. If contracts are symmetrically dis-
tributed across symmetric rms, the only relevant e¤ect of contracts is the one on the price-setters
prot-maximizing price. Hence, an increase in contracts up to rmscompetitive quantities is un-
ambiguously pro-competitive. However, this prediction may be reversed when rms are asymmetric,
as the e¤ects of contracts on the non-price-settersdeviation incentives, and thus on equilibrium ex-
istence, start to play a role. Indeed, if the contracted rmsincentives to lower prices are too strong,
the equilibria at which such rms set prices might disappear, potentially leading to even higher prices
than in the absence of contracts. As a consequence, there might arise a non-monotonic relationship
between contract volume and equilibrium prices, implying that more is not always better.
These results support the main message of the paper: since contract distribution and contract
volume are crucial in determining the e¤ects of forward contracts, there is scope for making them
pro-competitive. In markets with large asymmetries across rms, only the dominant rm should
be forced to hold forward contracts; getting contract volume right is less critical, as contracts in
this case would at worst be ine¤ective. Regulators should be more cautious in the presence of
mild asymmetries between large and medium-sized rms, as it is in such cases when the potential
anti-competitive e¤ects of contracts are more likely to arise.
In order to illustrate our theoretical results, we have performed a simulation exercise that uses
a rich data set of the Spanish electricity market. Assuming that contract volume remains xed
while demand varies over the year, the analysis shows that the pro-competitive e¤ect of contracts
dominates over the anti-competitive one. Still, the latter shows up in the simulations at certain
hours, depending on contract volume and contract allocation. In sum, forward contracts appear to
reduce mark-ups as well as to lower payments to producers.
There is already a large body of theoretical work on the impact of forward trading on the
performance of oligopolistic markets.7 However, existing papers are not fully applicable to the
ever, in that paper short-sellers face the risk of being squeezed in the secondary market, thus a¤ecting the auction
itself. Short-squeezes are not an issue in our setting as electricity markets are typically very liquid and most contracts
are settled by di¤erences with respect to the spot market price.
6To be more precise, this holds true as long as no rm has an excessive amount of contracts. Otherwise, the
non-price-setters might produce in an ine¢ cient manner. This is analyzed in detail in Section 6.
7There is also extensive empirical literature which conrms that contracts a¤ect the performance of spot markets.
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problem at hand, to the extent that they assume that ex-ante symmetric rms choose their contracts
prior to competing either à la Cournot (Allaz and Vila (1993) and Bushnell (2007)) or à la Bertrand
(Mahenc and Salanié (2004)).8 Instead, forward contract commitments are not endogenously chosen
by rms but rather imposed by regulators. Also, costs and capacity asymmetries are pervasive among
electricity producers. These two di¤erences explain why and when our predictions di¤er. In the
existing papers, and regardless of whether rms compete à la Cournot or à la Bertrand, forward
sales (purchases) induce rms to compete (less) more ercely given that spot market prices only
a¤ect their net-selling (net-buying) positions. However, once contracts are endogenized, the Cournot
model predicts that contracts are pro-competitive because all rms are net-sellers at the subgame
perfect equilibrium, whereas the opposite holds true under the Bertrand model. In contrast, our
model predicts that exogenously given contracts might have anti-competitive e¤ects even if rms
are net-sellers.9
As a by-product, our analysis also contributes to the literature on share auctions.10 In a common
value setting, Wilson (1979) shows that there exist equilibria with prices below the common value.
Kremer and Nyborg (2004) demonstrate that these kind of equilibria can be eliminated in a discrete
setting, similar to the one employed in the current paper, where quantities must be discrete though
prices need not. Restricting bidders to submit a nite number of price-quantity pairs implies that
there is a positive mass at the margin, so that competition for the margin destroys the underpricing
equilibria found by Wilson. In the current paper, in contrast, bidders can exploit the fact that
(weakly) increasing marginal costs lead to downward sloping residual demand functions, in the
same way as bidders can engage in demand reduction in a setting à la Wilson (see also Ausubel and
Cramton (2002)). In sum, by relaxing the at common value assumption, our paper recovers the
ine¢ ciencies in Wilson in a discrete setting à la Kremer and Nyborg.11
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general model, a simple example
of which is solved in Section 3. Sections 4 to 6 are devoted to the analysis of the general model,
including the characterization of rmsoptimal behaviour, equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium exis-
tence and multiplicity, and the impact of forward contracts. Section 7 contains a simulation exercise,
while Section 8 concludes. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
See Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia (2008), Fabra and Toro (2005), Hortacsu and Puller (2008), Kühn and Machado
(2006), Mansur (2007) or Wolak (2000, 2007).
8Newbery (1998) and Green (1999) obtain mixed results in models in which rms compete by choosing continuous
supply functions. Various papers analyze the dynamic e¤ects of contracts (Ferreira (2003); Green and Le Coq (2006);
Liski and Montero (2006)), and tend to conclude that they have anti-competitive e¤ects.
9 It is simple to show that, in a Cournot model with exogenously given contracts and asymmetric rms, forward
contracting is always (weakly) pro-competitive, regardless of contract distribution.
10 In most of the papers in this literature, bidders submit demand functions (to buy some underlying good) rather
than supply functions (to supply electricity), as in the current paper. However, as it is well known, whether one casts
the model in terms of demand or supply functions is immaterial because demand and supply games are isomorphic.
11To be sure, the reasons why we recover the underpricing equilibria are similar to the ones that explain why the
competitive outcome is not sustainable under Bertrand competition with capacity constraints, even though it consti-
tutes the unique equilibrium outcome under pure Bertrand competition. Within the electricity auctions literature,
simplied versions of our model also lead to a similar prediction (von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), García-Díaz and
Marín (2003), Fabra et al. (2006), and Crawford et al. (2007)).
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2 Description of the Model
We consider a multi-unit uniform-price auction model with complete information. There are N  2
rms that compete to supply a perfectly divisible good whose market demand, D(p); can be either
price-inelastic or downward-sloping, D0(p)  0: Its inverse function is denoted P (q).
Firm ns productive capacityKn; n = 1; :::; N; is made up of several units. Each unit has constant
marginal costs of production up to its capacity limit. We impose no constraints on the number of
units rms have (other than it must be nite), and allow for all types of asymmetries (both in size
and cost) among the units owned by a rm, as well as across rms. By stacking rm ns units in
increasing cost order, we construct its marginal cost curve, cn(q); which is a left-continuous non-
decreasing step function. We use Cn(q) to denote rm ns cost function, i.e., Cn(q) =
R q
0 cn(z)dz. In
line with the literature on electricity auctions, we assume that information on rmscosts is complete
because electricity generators share similar production technologies, and are thus well aware of the
e¢ ciencies of their plants and the cost of the fuels.
Firms compete by simultaneously submitting a nite number of price-quantity pairs to the
auctioneer. Prices cannot exceed the market-reserve pricepR (which, for simplicity but without
loss of generality, is assumed to exceed the highest marginal cost), and rms cannot produce above
their capacities. Note that restricting bidders to submit a nite number of price-quantity pairs
implies that rmsstrategies are left-continuous non-decreasing step functions with a nite number
of steps. We assume that both the height (prices) and length (quantities) of the steps are
continuous choice variables.
By ordering rmsprice-quantity pairs in increasing price order, we construct their bid functions,
i.e., for rm n;
bn = f(pns; qns)gss=1 ; pns 2

0; pR

with pns+1  pns; qns+1  qns with qns  Kn;
where s <1 is the maximum number of admissible steps in a rms bid function. Consistently with
actual rules in electricity auctions,12 we will assume that the number of admissible steps does not
constrain rms from bidding each unit at its own marginal cost, i.e., s is large enough so as to allow
rms to at least replicate their marginal cost curves. At each step s in rm ns bid function, pns
species the minimum price at which the rm is willing to produce up to quantity qns. Analogously,
for a given bid prole b = fbngNn=1 ; we construct the aggregate supply function, denoted S (q) ;
which determines the lowest price at which all rms in the market are willing to produce up to
quantity q:
On the basis of the bid prole, the auctioneer determines the stop-out price, p; which is dened
as follows,
p = max
q
fp = S (q) jS (q)  P (q)g :
In words, the stop-out price p is the point on the aggregate supply function, S (q), at which the
market clears. If the demand function P (q) is downward-sloping, it need not always intersect the
12The limit on the number of bids is typically set for each production unit rather than at the rm level. For instance,
in the original market design in England and Wales, rms were allowed to submit up to 3 incremental prices per unit;
up to 25 price-quantity pairs per unit in Spain; and up to 40 per unit in Texas. In practice, rms use even fewer
bidpoints than the ones they are allowed to (Hortacsu and Puller (2008)).
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(possibly) discontinuous aggregate supply function, in which case p is the highest price on the
aggregate supply function at which there is excess demand. To the contrary, if demand is inelastic,
there are potentially many market-clearing prices when the demand function intersects the supply
function at the right end of a step. In this case, p is the lowest price at which the market clears,
given that it must be on the (left-continuous) aggregate supply function.13 All transactions take
place at p:
The auctioneer then calls rms to produce in increasing price order up to p. We use qn to
denote the quantity allocated to rm n: If there is excess supply at p; we assume e¢ cient rationing
on-the-margin, i.e., if several units have been bid at p, they split residual demand proportionally to
the quantities o¤ered at exactly p, unless their marginal costs di¤er, in which case the low cost units
are dispatched rst.14 By using e¢ cient rationing, the set of equilibria of our game approximates the
set of equilibria of a game in which rationing pro-rata on-the margin is used but where rms choose
their bid prices on a nite grid, which is what occurs in real markets. In contrast, assuming rationing
pro-rata on-the margin in our set-up would lead to a problem of non-existence of equilibrium similar
to the one that arises under a Bertrand game with asymmetric costs.
We label prices and quantities as either competitive or non-competitive. The competitive price,
denoted pc; is the point on the aggregate cost function at which demand and competitive supply
intersect. As before, if they do not intersect, we assume that pc is the highest price on the aggregate
cost function at which there is excess demand. Formally,
pc = max
q
fp = C (q) jC (q)  P (q)g :
The resulting competitive quantities are denoted (qc1; :::; q
c
N ). All other prices and quantities are
referred to as non-competitive. Similar labels are used to classify market outcomes.
An important feature of the model is that rms might be subject to forward contracts. We use
n to denote rm ns contract price, and xn  0 to denote rm ns contract quantity;15 both n and
xn are xed when rms submit their bids. Consequently, when the stop-out price is p and rm ns
dispatched quantity is qn; rm ns prots are given by
n (p
; qn) = p
qn   Cn(qn) + [n   p]xn; (1)
where the rst two terms give the rms market prots, and the last term gives the rms contract
13These assumptions are consistent with most auction rules in practice. For instance, in the Spanish electricity
market, demand bids cannot determine the stop-out price (see www.omel.es). The fact that the auctioneer chooses
the lowest market-clearing price whenever there are multiple market-clearing prices is reasonable to the extent that
it is the most favourable one from consumerspoint of view. This is also assumed in Kremer and Nyborg (2004) and
Kastl (2008)- note however that in these papers the stop-out price is assumed to be the highest market-clearing price
as the auctioneer is selling rather than buying the underlying good.
14Several papers in the electricity auctions literature also assume e¢ cient rationing on-the-margin (see García-Díaz
and Marín (2003) and Fabra et al. (2006), among others). Instead, papers in the Treasury auctions literature typically
adopt the rationing pro rata on-the-margin rule, which rations the marginal bids at p proportionally to the total
quantity o¤ered at exactly p; regardless of their marginal costs (see Back and Zender (1993) and Kastl (2008), among
others).
15We adopt the convention that xn > 0 corresponds to rm n selling contracts (i.e., taking a short-position). We
do not allow rms to buy forward contracts since in real markets regulators typically impose sale obligations.
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prots.16 To x ideas, one can think of these contracts as being purely nancial, i.e., rm n
continues to supply all its quantity qn to the market at p and the contracts counterpart, e.g. a
big customer, continues to buy all its demand from the market at p. The contract requires rm n
to pay (receive) the di¤erence between the contract price and the stop-out price times the contract
quantity, [n   p]xn; whenever positive (negative). Re-writing the above expression as
n (p
; qn) = p
 [qn   xn]  Cn(qn) + nxn; (2)
shows that rmsbidding incentives depend on their net-positions, [qn   xn] ; which are positive for
the net-sellers, qn > xn; and negative for the net-buyers, qn < xn. The last term, nxn; is xed when
rms compete in the spot market; as such, it has no e¤ect on bidding incentives (indeed, one could
set n = 0 without loss of generality). We will assume that total contract volume never exceeds
demand at the competitive price,
P
n xn  D (pc) ; thus ruling out the cases in which xn  qcn holds
for all rms n (with at least one strict inequality).
Firm ns problem is to choose a nite number of price-quantity pairs that maximize n given its
rivalsbid functions. We focus on Nash equilibria in pure strategies. All aspects of the model are
common knowledge among rms.
Before we proceed, it is convenient to set some terminology and notation. We rst dene which
rms are marginal :
Denition 1 For an arbitrary bid function prole resulting in an outcome fp; (q1; :::; qN )g ; rm
n is marginal if its bid function has some step s at the stop-out price, pns = p:
We use the above denition to also classify rms as either price-setters or non-price-setters:
Denition 2 For an arbitrary bid function prole resulting in an outcome fp; (q1; :::; qN )g ; rm
n is a price- setter if it is a marginal rm and if it is at least partly dispatching its marginal step,
qn 2 (qns 1;qns]. Otherwise, rm n is a non-price-setter.
Finally, both the stop-out price and the dispatched quantities depend on the demand, D(p); and
the bid function prole, b. However, in order to simplify notation, we suppress these arguments
whenever clear from the context.
3 Illustrative Example
We start by analyzing a simple example to convey the intuitions of the main results of the paper.
In particular, we x N = 2 and assume that demand is perfectly inelastic at D = 3: There exist
four types of units, each with capacity normalized to one, whose marginal costs are 0, 1, 2 or 2:5.
Finally, we assume without loss of generality that the contract price is zero, n = 0:
16 In models of vertical integration, the rst two terms would represent the prots of the upstream subsidiary, while
the third term would accrue to the downstream subsidiary.
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3.1 Symmetric rms
We start by assuming that each rm owns one unit at each cost level, so that rm ns marginal cost
function is cn = f(0; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (2; 3) ; (2:5; 4)g ; n = 1; 2:
We rst show that in the absence of contracts, the competitive outcome cannot be sustained in
equilibrium. Suppose that both rms bid at marginal costs, bn = cn; n = 1; 2; so that the aggregate
supply function is S = f(0; 2) ; (1; 4) ; (2; 6) ; (2:5; 8)g. Since the auctioneer has to dispatch three units
to satisfy demand, the competitive outcome is fpc = 1; (qc1 = 1:5; qc2 = 1:5)g with cn = 1; n = 1; 2: If
rm 2 deviates to bidding its rst three units at 2; i.e., b02 = f(2; 3) ; (2:5; 4)g ; the aggregate supply
function becomes S0 = f(0; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (2; 6) ; (2:5; 8)g ; the stop-out price is raised to p = 2, and
rmsdispatched quantities are q1 = 2 and q2 = 1 (by the e¢ cient tie-breaking rule, rm 2s rst
unit is dispatched at capacity, as it has lower marginal costs than any of the other units that tie at
2). Since 02 = 2 > c2; we have found a protable deviation. Thus, the competitive outcome cannot
be sustained in equilibrium, unless rms used weakly-dominated strategies, a possibility ruled out
throughout the paper.
Indeed, the bid function prole fb1; b02g constitutes an equilibrium: rm 2 is setting the stop-out
price at the level that maximizes its prots over its residual demand, while rm 1 is producing the
maximum it can without incurring in losses and would sell nothing if it tried to further increase the
price. By reversing rmsindexes, we nd another equilibrium that only di¤ers in the identity of the
rm that sets the price at p = 2. Furthermore, even when holding rmsidentities xed, the same
outcome can be sustained by many other equilibria, e.g. by b^1 = f(0; 0:5) ; (1; 2) ; (2; 3) ; (2:5; 4)g and
b^2 = f(2; 3) ; (4; 4)g ; to write just one. However, such equilibrium multiplicity is outcome-irrelevant
as both equilibria result in the same stop-out price and, conditionally on rmsidentities, lead to
the same output allocation across rms. This illustrates that, even though the strategy space is
quite large, we need just focus on candidate equilibrium outcomes.
Let us now introduce forward contracts. In particular, suppose x1 = 0 < x2 2 (1; 2]: If rm 1
bids at marginal costs, rm 2s prot-maximizing price now equals p = 1 rather than p = 2: To see
this, note that if rm 2 sets the stop-out price at p = 2; it becomes a net-buyer with x2 > q2 = 1.
As such, it prefers to reduce the price to p = 1 by e.g. bidding at marginal costs. Indeed, since
marginal cost bidding allows rm 2 to save the price di¤erence over its net-buying position, its
prots increase by [1  2] [1  x2] > 0: Therefore, the equilibrium at which rm 2 sets the price at
p = 2 can no longer be sustained, whereas the equilibrium at which rm 1 sets the price at p = 2
can still be sustained (rm 1s incentives are unchanged as it has no contracts, while rm 2 does
not nd it protable to reduce the price as it is either a net-seller or has a balanced net-position,
x2  q2 = 2):
Therefore, contracts by one rm may imply that the equilibrium at which such a rm sets the
price disappears. Whereas this is relevant from rms point of view - the contracted rm now
makes (weakly) higher prots as it produces more, - it is price-irrelevant as the stop-out price at the
surviving equilibrium remains the same. Therefore, forward contracts have no impact on equilibrium
prices in this case. However, the symmetry assumption is crucial to obtain this conclusion. If
rms are asymmetric, their prot-maximizing prices at the no-contracts case might di¤er as well.
Accordingly, if contracts by one rm destroy the equilibrium at which such a rm sets the price, the
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Equilibrium Prices
No contracts xi 2 (1; 2] > xj = 0
Symmetric rms f2; 2g f?; 2g
Firm i is large f2:5; 2g f?; 2g
Firm i is small f2; 2:5g f?; 2:5g
Table 1: Equilibrium clearing prices as a function of rmsforward contract positions
Note: the rst (second) term in brackets is the price that rm i (rm j) would set in equilibrium when its
rival bids at marginal costs; there is an ? if such an equilibrium does not exist.
e¤ect of introducing contracts might no longer be price-irrelevant. We next show that this is indeed
the case.
3.2 Asymmetric rms
Assume now that rm 2 has transferred its third unit to rm 1, so that their marginal cost functions
now become c1 = f(0; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (2; 4) ; (2:5; 5)g and c2 = f(0; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (2:5; 3)g : Accordingly, rms
1 and 2 will be respectively referred to as the large rmand the small rm.
In the absence of contracts, there now exist two equilibrium outcomes: (i) one with rm 2 setting
the stop-out price at p = 2; and prots 1 = 3 and 2 = 2; and (ii) a new one with rm 1 setting the
stop-out price at p = 2:5; and prots 1 = 2:5 and 2 = 4. Note that none of these two equilibria
can be ruled out by appealing to Pareto dominance, given that each rm is better-o¤ when the rival
sets the price.
Since rms prot-maximizing prices di¤er, it is no longer inconsequential whether contracts
are allocated to the large or to the small rm. Let us rst allocate all contracts to the large rm,
x1 2 (1; 2] > x2 = 0: In contrast to the no-contracts case just described, the equilibrium with rm
1 setting the price at p = 2:5 can no longer be sustained: as a net-buyer, rm 1 would rather bid
at marginal costs in order to reduce the price from p = 2:5 to p = 1. However, if rm 1 bids at
marginal costs, rm 2 is better o¤ setting the price at p = 2. Since only the low-price equilibrium
outcome survives, the introduction of contracts is pro-competitive.
Alternatively, let us now allocate all contracts to the small rm, x2 2 (1; 2] > x1 = 0: By the
same logic, the equilibrium with rm 2 setting the price at p = 2 disappears: as a net-buyer, rm
2 would rather bid at marginal costs in order to reduce the price from p = 2 to p = 1. However,
rm 1 would then respond by setting the price at p = 2:5, which implies that the only surviving
equilibrium outcome is the one with the high price. Hence, forward contracts are anti-competitive
in this case. Table 1 summarizes these results.
To sum-up, this example illustrates that the impact of forward contracts on bidding incentives
and equilibrium outcomes critically depends on its distribution among rms. Even though contracts
reduce rmsincentives to increase prices, equilibrium prices need not be lower as contracts might
also jeopardize the existence of the equilibria in which the contracted rm sets the price. Indeed,
contracts might lead to (weakly) higher prices whenever they are awarded in su¢ ciently large quan-
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tity to the rm that would set lower prices without contracts (in this example, the small rm).
Furthermore, this e¤ect can only be uncovered once the symmetry assumption is relaxed.
4 Analysis of the Model
In this section, we characterize equilibrium bidding behavior and equilibrium outcomes in the general
model. Rather than deriving equilibrium strategies, we instead deduce structural features that any
equilibrium must have. As it is common in the analysis of uniform-price auctions, we rst rene the
equilibrium set by restricting attention to strategies that are not weakly-dominated. In the absence
of contracts, bidding below marginal costs is a weakly-dominated strategy (García-Díaz and Marín
(2003) and Crawford et al. (2007)). However, when rms hold contracts, this is not generally the
case, as shown next.
Lemma 1 For rm n; it is weakly-dominated (i) to bid below marginal costs for quantities above
its contract cover, qn > xn, as well as (ii) to bid above marginal costs for quantities not exceeding
its contract cover, qn < xn:
In words, weak-dominance arguments eliminate below marginal cost bidding only for quantities
above the rms contract cover, qn > xn; i.e., such that the rm is a net-seller.17 At lower quantities,
the rm is a net-buyer, and as such it would like to exercise monopsony power by bidding some
units below marginal cost. Consistently with this, weak-dominance arguments also eliminate above
marginal cost bidding for quantities below the rms contract cover, qn < xn. We cannot rule out
either below or above marginal cost bidding for qn = xn because bid functions are step functions.
With continuous bid functions instead, bidding qn = xn at marginal costs would be a dominant
strategy.
In what follows, we will rst x the identity of the price-setter in order to characterize the
non-price-settersoptimal bidding behavior.
Lemma 2 At any Nash Equilibrium in which rm i is a price-setter, all other rms j; j 6= i; are
fully dispatching all their units with marginal costs strictly below the equilibrium price p:
The intuition underlying Lemma 2 above is simple. Given that rm i is dispatching some output
at p, it cannot be the case that some other rm j; j 6= i; has some unit with marginal costs strictly
below p that has not been called to produce. If it instead bid such an undispatched unit slightly
below p, rm j would earn a positive prot margin over its increased production, with only (if any)
a slight reduction in the price. Key to this result is the fact that rms submit a nite number of
price-quantity pairs, which implies that there is a positive output mass at the margin. Hence, when
rm j reduces its bid, the quantity gain always outweighs the price reduction as the latter can be
made arbitrarily small.
17Kastl (2008) shows that in discrete multi-unit uniform-price auctions, a rational bidder (without contracts) may
submit a bid above its marginal valuation (in the current paper, a bid below marginal costs). This occurs only when
the number of admissible steps in the bid functions is lower than the number of units, as it implies that bidders have to
bundle bids for several units together. However, this does not arise in our paper given that, consistently with practice,
bidders can at least submit as many bids as units they own.
9
Lemma 3 At any Nash Equilibrium in which rm i is a price-setter, rm j; j 6= i; is not dispatching
any unit with marginal costs strictly above the equilibrium price p if either one of the following two
conditions holds:
1) rm j is a net-seller or has a balanced position, i.e., qj  xj ; or
2) there is at least one marginal rm that is not fully dispatching its marginal step, i.e., p = pks
and qk < qks; k 6= j.
By elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, net-sellers cannot sell their marginal output
below marginal costs. Similarly, rms with a balanced position do not nd it protable to bid below
marginal costs in equilibrium given that by bidding at marginal costs they could save the di¤erence
between their marginal costs and the equilibrium price times their reduced output. Hence, qj  xj
is su¢ cient to guarantee that rm j does not dispatch any unit with marginal costs below p.
The same result does not apply in general to an equilibrium in which rm j is a net-buyer, unless
some other rm k has bid some step at p which has not been fully dispatched (i.e., p = pks and
qk < qks). When this is the case, rm j can avoid producing at a loss by bidding some of its output
slightly above p; with no e¤ect on the price. However, if all the marginal rms are fully dispatching
their marginal steps, rm j may be unable to reduce its production so as to avoid productive losses
unless it raises the price high enough. As rm j is a net-buyer, the price increase - which may no
longer be innitesimal - may reduce the rms prots (rm j reduces productive losses but buys its
negative net position at a higher price). There is hence no guarantee that in an equilibrium in which
rm i is a price-setter, the other rms produce in an e¢ cient manner unless they are all net-sellers.
Note that this result only arises with contracts as, otherwise, all rms would trivially be net-sellers.
The next Proposition combines the two lemmas above to provide conditions under which at any
equilibria the non-price-setters behave as if they were price-takers. This does not imply that they
do not act strategically; to the contrary, the non-price-setters are the ones that benet the most
from the (potential) exercise of market power, while the price-setters must bear the cost.
Proposition 1 At any Nash Equilibrium in which rm i is a price-setter, rm j; j 6= i; produces
the same "as if" it were bidding at marginal costs if either one of the two conditions in the statement
of Lemma 3 hold.
The conditions under which Proposition 1 holds relate to equilibrium features, which are en-
dogenous, such as the identity of the price-setter or the non-price-settersequilibrium net-positions.
Nevertheless, one can guarantee that at any equilibrium Proposition 1 always holds if all rms are
net-sellers at the competitive outcome. This condition relates to the primitives of the game, which
are no longer endogenous.
To see why this is the case, note that weak-dominance arguments imply that if xn < qcn holds for
all rms, they must all bid their competitive quantities at or above marginal costs. Therefore, the
equilibrium price p cannot be lower than pc. This implies that those rms that bid at marginal costs
must be producing more than at the competitive outcome, and are thus net-sellers; while those rms
that bid above marginal costs must also be net-sellers by elimination of weakly-dominated strategies.
Therefore, since condition 1) of Lemma 3 is satised, Proposition 1 applies.
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In contrast, Proposition 1 does not generally hold if some rms are net-buyers at the competitive
outcome. First, since p  pc cannot be ruled out, even the rms that are bidding at marginal costs
may produce below their competitive quantities, and hence remain/become net-buyers. Moreover,
even if p > pc; and some rms expand production above their competitive quantities, such an
increase in quantity might not be enough so as to exceed their contract positions.
For these reasons, it will be useful to analyze these two cases separately, which we respectively
refer to as the regular cases (in which xn < qcn for all rms) and the irregular cases (in which xn < q
c
n
holds for some but not all rms). Arguably, the regular cases are the empirically most relevant ones
(in practice, regulators never force rms to holding contracts above their competitive quantities),
but for completeness we will also cover the irregular cases in Section 6.
5 Regular Cases
We start the analysis of the regular cases by identifying conditions under which the competitive
outcome constitutes the unique equilibrium outcome of the game. On the one hand, we provide
primitives of the game which are su¢ cient for all rms to behave competitively. On the other hand,
we derive properties of the equilibrium bid proles that sustain the competitive outcome.
Proposition 2 Let xn < qcn hold for all rms.
(i) If for any n; all rms but rm n can jointly serve total competitive demand D (pc) without
losses, then the competitive outcome, p = pc and qn = qcn for all n; is the unique equilibrium
outcome.
(ii) Whenever there is supply rationing at pc, any Nash equilibrium results in the competitive
outcome if and only if there is more than one price-setter.
If every possible combination of (N   1) rms can jointly serve total demand at the competitive
price, the residual demand faced by the Nth rm would fall down to zero if it deviated optimally
from the competitive equilibrium. Hence, all rms have no option but to behave competitively. If
this condition did not hold, the Nth rm would have the possibility of manipulating the price up a
notch. If such a rm is marginal at the competitive outcome, it will certainly bid above marginal
costs in order to make prots out of its marginal output. However, if it is not marginal, meaning
that it is making strictly positive prots out of all its dispatched units, it might not nd it protable
to deviate if the losses from reducing output exceed the gains due to the price increase. Hence, while
the condition in part (i) of Proposition 2 above is su¢ cient for the competitive outcome to emerge,
it is nevertheless not necessary.
But for knife-edge cases with no supply rationing at pc, the coexistence of multiple price-setters
is both necessary and su¢ cient for the competitive outcome to be sustainable. If there was only
one price-setter, its bid would determine the stop-out price, and the rm would have incentives to
engage in supply reduction.18 The upshot of this is that with multiple price-setters, the equilibrium
must be competitive as any of them would otherwise gain by slightly undercutting the price in order
to achieve a positive increase in output. It follows that there cannot occur (payo¤-relevant) ties at
18Arguments here are identical to those in Ausubel and Cramton (2002) to get optimal demand reduction in uniform-
price auctions.
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the margin among dispatched units, unless the equilibrium is competitive. In contrast, ties at the
equilibrium price with only one rm dispatching output at the margin will be (almost always) the
rule. This will be clearly the case with inelastic demand, as the price-setter will optimally drive the
price up to the next step in its rivalsbid functions.19
The reason why the statement of part (ii) does not include certain knife-edge cases is simple.
If there was no supply rationing at pc, there could exist equilibria with p > pc with ties at the
margin, as long as rms still produce their competitive quantities. Since all rms are rationed at
pc; they would also be rationed at prices slightly above pc; and would hence have no incentives to
ght for market share at the margin. One simple example in which this is the case has D = 2,
c1 = c2 = f(0; 1)g and c3 = f(c; 1)g : In equilibrium, p = c > 0 = pc while qn = qcn = 1 for n = 1; 2;
and q3 = qc3 = 0: Both rms 1 and 2 could be price-setters if they bid at b1 = b2 = f(c; 1)g ; but
the same outcome would also arise with just one of them bidding at c while the other bids below.
In this sense, if there is no supply rationing at pc, ties at the margin among dispatched units can
occur in equilibrium, but such ties are payo¤ irrelevant.
An important consequence of Proposition 2 is that at any non-competitive Nash equilibrium,
there is a unique price-setter. This fact allows us to proceed by xing the identity of the price-setter
and treating all other rms as non-price-setters. This approach is appropriate even for competitive
equilibria, as there would be more than one price-setter (Proposition 2) but they would also behave
as non-price-setters in equilibrium (Proposition 1).
5.1 The non-price-settersand the price-setters optimal behavior
In order to derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium bidding, we will rst
characterize rmsoptimal bidding behavior conditional on their identities.
By Proposition 1, we already know that the non-price-setters behave as price-takers, i.e., they
have to decide how much to produce at a given stop-out price, p. Formally,
qNPSj (p
) 2 argmax
qj
NPSj
 
p; qj

;
where
NPSj
 
p; qj

= p

qj   xj
  Cj  qj +  jxj :
Note that, in order to produce qNPSj (p
) ; the non-price-setters can bid at marginal costs or use
any other outcome equivalent strategy. However, their choice of bidding strategies is not irrelevant,
as these determine the shape of the residual demand faced by the price-setter and hence its optimal
bidding behavior. For this reason, we will not assume that the non-price-setters bid at marginal
costs, unless we make it explicit. It follows that we can readily compute the price-setters production
in equilibrium, but not outside the equilibrium. In particular, at any candidate equilibrium with
p = pc; the price-setter produces qci ; while if p
 > pc; given that the market must clear, the
19With a rationing pro rata on-the-margin rule, such a tie at the margin would not arise. Nevertheless, the outcome
would (almost perfectly) approximate the equilibrium outcome under the e¢ cient tie-breaking rule. Note that if the
tie-breaking rule did not allocate the marginal output to the low cost rm rst, such a rm would avoid the tie by
bidding slightly below its rivalsrst non-accepted bid.
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price-setter produces
qPSi (p
) = D (p) 
X
j 6=i
qNPSj (p
):
However, the above equation might not be satised at prices other than the equilibrium price, given
that the non-price-setters need not be bidding at marginal costs outside the equilibrium, and given
that the market need not always clear.
The nature of the price-setters problem clearly di¤ers from that of the non-price-setters. Instead
of choosing how much to produce at a given price, the price-setter behaves as if it were to choose
the stop-out price that maximizes its prots over its residual demand, i.e., total demand minus the
quantity that the non-price-setters are willing to supply at each price. Formally,
pPSi (b i) 2 argmax
p
PSi (p
; b i) ; (3)
where
PSi (p
; b i) = p [qi (p
; b i)  xi]  C (qi (p; b i)) +  ixi;
and,
qi (p
; b i) = max
8<:0; D (p) X
j 6=i
qj (p
; b j)
9=; :
Since both the cost function and the residual demand faced by the price-setter are step-functions,
its prot function may fail to be di¤erentiable, so that the price-setters prot-maximizing price
might not be obtained as the solution to a rst order condition. Therefore, in order to understand
the price-setters bidding incentives, consider the change in rm is prots when it raises the stop-out
price from p to some p0 > p,
PSi
 
p0; b i
  PSi (p; b i) = p0   p qi  p0; b i  xi  Z qi (p;b i)
qi (p0;b i)
[p   ci (z)] dz: (4)
As in any standard monopoly problem, a price increase implies greater revenues through the rms
net-position - the rst term in (4), - but it also implies a prot loss due to the output reduction
- the second term in (4). Accordingly, the price-setters incentives to raise the price are stronger
the bigger its net-position is, the less elastic its residual demand is, and the smaller the price-cost
margin on its lost production is. It then follows that rm is prot-maximizing price given its rivals
strategies, pPSi (b i) ; is non-increasing in its contract cover, xi: This mimics the standard result that
smaller rms (here, rms with smaller net-positions) have weaker incentives to raise prices.
We conclude this subsection by comparing the price-setters and non-price-settersprots. To
simplify notation, we will write PSi (p
) and NPSj (p
) ; for j 6= i; to respectively denote the price-
setters and non-price-settersprots when the former sets the stop-out price at p and all the latter
produce qNPSj (p
).
Lemma 4 Let xn < qcn hold for all rms. For any stop-out price p
; (i) the non-price-settersprots
NPSj (p
) are increasing in p; and (ii) they weakly exceed those they would get as a price-setter at
the same stop-out price, PSi (p
)  NPSi (p).
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Since under the regular cases all rms are net-sellers in equilibrium, any price increase makes the
non-price-setters strictly better-o¤. Because of this, we will assume that whenever the price-setter
is indi¤erent between multiple prices, it always chooses the highest one as it is the Pareto dominant
one. By denition, the price-setter is indi¤erent between these prices, but the non-price-setters are
strictly better o¤ when the highest maximizer is chosen (as shown in Lemma 4 above). Finally,
the prots that a rm earns as a non-price-setter are bounded below by the prots it could obtain
as a price-setter: both the non-price-setters and the price-setter are paid the same price, but the
price-setter sells (weakly) less and thus gives up a positive prot margin on its reduced production.
5.2 Equilibrium characterization
We have already characterized rmsoptimal behavior conditional on their identities, but the equi-
librium characterization also requires an assessment of whether the price-setter prefers to become
a non-price-setter and vice-versa. An equilibrium outcome is a collection of quantities produced
by the non-price-setters and a price chosen by the price-setter such that no rm wants to deviate,
either by changing its quantity or price choice, or by changing its identity. The following Theorem
provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium bidding in the regular cases.
Theorem 1 Let xn < qcn hold for all rms. A strategy prole b constitutes a Nash equilibrium in
which rm i is the price-setter if and only if the following three conditions hold:
1) p = pPSi (b i)  pc and qj = qNPSj (p) for all j 6= i:
2) PSi (p
)  NPSi (p) for all p < p such that qNPSi (p) +
P
j 6=i qj(p; b) = D(p):
3) NPSj (p
)  PSj

pPSj

for all j 6= i such that pPSj (b j) > p.
In equilibrium, the price-setter chooses the price that maximizes its prots over the residual
demand, p = pPSi (b i) : By weak-dominance arguments, it must be either equal or above the
competitive price. All the other rms must behave as price-takers given p; and hence produce the
same as if they were bidding at marginal costs (Proposition 1).
By condition 1) of Theorem 1 above, all rms are already optimizing conditionally on their
identities. Thus, the only relevant deviations are those by which rms reverse their identities. Since
the price-setter might consider becoming a non-price-setter in order to sell more at a lower stop-out
price,20 condition 2) is needed to rule out such deviations. In turn, since all the non-price-setters
are net-sellers in equilibrium, those with prot-maximizing prices no larger than p never nd it
optimal to deviate: not only they would sell their production at a (weakly) lower price, but they
would also sell less. Hence, the only relevant deviations are those by the remaining non-price-setters,
but condition 3) rules them out.
5.3 Equilibrium existence and multiplicity
For a given price-setter, there exist multiple bid function proles that constitute an equilibrium
(all those satisfying Theorem 1). This derives from the fact that rms only care about one point
in their bid functions, the one corresponding to the stop-out price. Furthermore, the multiplicity
20Note that at the resulting price, there must be market clearing, as otherwise the deviant could bid so as to sell
the same quantity at the price that clears the market.
14
of equilibrium bid functions may pave the way for multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes to emerge.
Fortunately, this is not the case, as stated next.21
Proposition 3 (i) There exists an equilibrium in which rm i is the price-setter if and only if the
equilibrium in which rm i sets the price at p = pPSi (c i) while all the other rms bid at marginal
costs exists. (ii) Furthermore, if there also exist other equilibria in which rm i is the price-setter,
the one above is the Pareto dominant one.
Proposition 3 implies that, conditionally on the identity of the price-setter, there is no loss of
generality (as far as equilibrium outcomes are concerned) in restricting attention to equilibria in
which the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs and the price-setter maximizes its prots over the
resulting residual demand. This claim is supported by two important facts: if such an equilibrium
does not exist, there does not exist any other equilibrium in which the same rm acts a the price-
setter; while if it exists, it is either the unique equilibrium or the Pareto dominant one.
The next result, which is a corollary of Theorem 1, guarantees equilibrium existence. In partic-
ular, the candidate equilibrium with the highest price always exists.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium with p = maxi pPSi (c i) always exists.
So far, we have shown that, conditionally on the identity of the price-setter, equilibrium multi-
plicity is irrelevant for equilibrium outcomes. However, the multiplicity of equilibria that di¤er in
the identity of the price-setter might potentially result in di¤erent equilibrium prices. This multi-
plicity was highlighted in the illustrative example provided in Section 3 but it holds more generally.
Furthermore, existence of a candidate equilibrium implies that all other candidate equilibria with
higher equilibrium prices also exist. To understand this, note that the prots that a rm achieves
as a price-setter are given, but the prots it makes as a non-price-setter are increasing in the equi-
librium price (Lemma 4). Hence, if none of the rms has incentives to deviate from a candidate
equilibrium, it must also be the case that none of them wants to deviate from a candidate equilib-
rium with a higher price. For similar reasons, if a candidate equilibrium does not exist, there does
not exist any other candidate equilibrium with a lower price. These results are stated in the last
corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2 If the equilibrium with p = pPSi (c i) exists, the equilibria with p
 = pPSn (c n) 
pPSi (c i) also exist. Alternatively, if it does not exist, the equilibria with p
 = pPSn (c n)  pPSi (c i)
do not exist either, n = 1; :::; N:
Combining the two corollaries above, it follows that under the same primitives of the game, a
competitive equilibrium cannot coexist with a non-competitive equilibrium.
21 In contrast, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes is pervasive in auctions with continuous bid functions (seeWilson
(1979), Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and Back and Zender (1993), among others). See also the analysis of the irregular
cases in Section 6, which also give rise to multiple equilibria.
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5.4 The impact of forward contracts
We are now ready to analyze the impact of forward contract commitments on equilibrium outcomes.
To do so, we will focus on those cases under which the equilibrium is non-competitive in the absence
of contracts. The reason is two-fold: rst, these are indeed the cases under which forward contract
commitments are used by regulators in practice; and second, if the equilibrium was competitive
even without contracts, introducing them would trivially make no di¤erence. Since our aim is to
perform comparative statics with respect to changes in contracts, in what follows, with some abuse
of notation, we will write pPSi (xi) to denote the prot-maximizing price of rm i when its rivals
bid at marginal costs and its contract obligation is xi: We will also index rms according to their
prot-maximizing prices at the no-contracts case, i.e., pPS1 (0)  pPS2 (0)  :::  pPSN (0) :
Suppose rst that rms are symmetric in all respects. The next lemma characterizes the impact
on prices and productive e¢ ciency of increasing total contracts when they are either symmetrically
or asymmetrically distributed among rms.
Lemma 5 In a symmetric oligopoly,
(i) If forward contracts are equally distributed among rms, i.e., x1 = ::: = xN = x < qc;
equilibrium prices are non-increasing in x and productive e¢ ciency is non-decreasing in x:
(ii) If forward contracts are not equally distributed among rms, the highest equilibrium price
is (weakly) higher and its associated productive e¢ ciency is (weakly) lower than under the equal
contract distribution.
Since rms are fully symmetric, there exist N price-equivalent equilibrium outcomes that only
di¤er in the identity of the price-setter. As rmscontract cover is increased, the equilibrium price
is reduced and productive e¢ ciency is improved.22 Furthermore, any departure from the symmetric
contract distribution would weaken the positive e¤ect of contracts as rmsex-ante symmetry, which
induces more competitive outcomes, would no longer be preserved. For given contracts, similar
results also arise in Allaz and Vila (1993)s and Bushnell (2007)s Cournot models, as well as in
Newberys (1998) Supply Function Equilibrium model.
We next allow for all types of asymmetries among rms, and perform comparative statics with
respect to contract volume up to rms competitive quantities, depending on the distribution of
contracts across rms.
Proposition 4 Consider an asymmetric oligopoly, such that at the no-contracts case equilibrium
prices are

pPS1 (0) ; :::; p
PS
i (0)
	
for 1  i  N; while prices pPSn (0) for i < n  N cannot be
sustained because rm 1 would deviate.
(i) If forward contracts are awarded to rm 1 only, prices are (weakly) lower than at the no-
contracts case. Furthermore, a (weak) non-monotonic relationship between contract volume and
equilibrium prices may arise.
(ii) If forward contracts are awarded to rm i only, there exists x0i 2 (0; qci ) ; such that any
contract allocation xi < x0i leads to (weakly) lower prices than at the no-contracts case, whereas any
22 In contrast, if total contract volume was further increased (taking us away from the regular cases), rms would
start exercising monopsony power, leading to prices below the competitive price. Furthermore, since the price-setter
would produce more than at the competitive outcome, productive ine¢ ciencies might emerge.
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contract allocation xi  x0i leads to (weakly) higher prices. Hence, there is a (weak) non-monotonic
relationship between contract volume and equilibrium prices.
(iii) If forward contracts are awarded to rms n > i only, they have no e¤ect on equilibrium
outcomes.
At the no-contracts case, rm 1 and rm i set the highest and lowest equilibrium prices respec-
tively, while rms n > i behave as price-takers at any equilibrium. Accordingly, we say that rm
1 and rm i have highand lowmarket power respectively, while rms n > i have nomarket
power at all. The impact of forward contracts on equilibrium prices depends on how contracts are
awarded among these rms.
To understand the results in Proposition 4 above, it is important to rst recall that as a rms
contracts go up, its prot-maximizing price (weakly) goes down. In turn, given that a low price
makes it relatively more attractive for an uncontracted non-price-setter to become the price-setter,
the equilibrium in which the contracted rm sets the price might disappear. By the opposite logic,
the contracted rm now nds it more appealing to be the non-price-setter, so that if no other rm
has incentives to deviate, there can now appear new equilibria involving lower prices. These e¤ects
are illustrated in Figures 1 to 4.
If all contracts are awarded to the rm with high market power, as in part (i), contracts
(weakly) reduce prices with respect to the no-contracts case. This holds true regardless of whether
the equilibrium in which the contracted rms sets the price disappears (Figure 1), and regardless
of whether new equilibria arise (Figure 3), given that in any case the remaining equilibria result in
lower prices.
The above conclusion may be reversed when all contracts are awarded to the rm with low
market power, as in part (ii). In this case, it is still true that contracts (weakly) reduce prices when
the rm with lowmarket power sets the price. However, prices might go up when such equilibrium
disappears (for xi  x0i). Given that the equilibrium price will then be set by rms with higher
prot-maximizing prices, contracts in this case may result in (weakly) higher prices as compared to
the no-contracts case (Figure 2).23 Last, if contracts are awarded to rms with no market power,
as in part (iii), contracts simply have no e¤ect as such rms behave as price-takers with or without
contracts (Figure 4).
To conclude, when contracts are allocated to rms with market power, an increase in contract
volume does not always lead to price reductions. Indeed, an increase in contract volume may lead
to (weakly) higher prices whenever such an increase in contracts destroys the equilibrium in which
the contracted rm sets the price (Figures 1 to 3).
[INSERT FIGURES 1-4 AROUND HERE]
23The cases in which rms 1 < n < i hold contracts are similar to case (ii) in the Proposition. There exists
x0n 2 (0; qcn) such that allocating contracts xn < x0n to rm n leads to (weakly) lower prices because the equilibrium
at which rm n sets the price still exists. However, contracts xn  x0n eliminate such equilibrium, with some of the
remaining equilibria leading to either higher or lower prices. Hence, the e¤ects of contracts in these cases depend on
equilibrium selection, but the anti-competitive e¤ects cannot be ruled out.
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Interestingly, note that the classication of rms as having either high, lowor nomarket
power, and hence the e¤ect of forward contracts on prices, depends on the degree of rmsasym-
metries. Large asymmetries, such that only one rm has market power at the no-contracts case,
lead to a clear-cut policy conclusion: the dominant rm should be forced to hold contracts; getting
contract volume wrong in this case is not very costly, as contracts would in any case be e¤ective.
To the contrary, mild asymmetries among rms (particularly so, between the rms with highand
lowmarket power) might give rise to the anti-competitive e¤ects identied in Proposition 4. It is
in these cases when the regulator should be most cautious when deciding on contract volume and
its distribution among rms.
6 Irregular cases
In this section, we assess whether the results we have derived so far are robust to some rms holding
fewer contracts than their competitive quantities while others hold more, i.e., xn < qcn for some rms
and xn  qcn for others.
Similar results to those found under the regular cases regarding equilibrium characterization,
equilibrium existence and multiplicity, also arise under the irregular cases as long as in equilibrium
all rms are either net-sellers or have a balanced position, i.e., as long as xi  qi holds for all
rms. The intuition is simple: if all rmsnet-positions at the candidate equilibrium have the same
sign (or no sign at all), they face no conict of interests among them. In particular, none of the
non-price-setters wants to deviate in order to reduce the price and, given that Proposition 1 applies,
none of them wants to change its production as they are all producing the same as if they were
bidding at marginal costs.
In contrast, the properties of the equilibria in which net-sellers and net-buyers coexist might
drastically di¤er from those derived under the regular cases, as the coexistence of net-buyers and
net-sellers gives rise to a conict of interests among them. Several implications follow from this.
First, as already argued, there is no guarantee that the non-price-setters produce e¢ ciently, given
that Proposition 1 need not hold for the net-buyers. To see this, consider for instance a duopoly
facing inelastic demand, D = 6; with costs c1 = f(0; 1) ; (1; 5) ; (c; 6)g ; c2 = f(0; 1) ; (c; 6)g ; where
c > 1; and contracts x2 = 6 > qc2 = 1 and x1 = 0 < q
c
1 = 5: The bid prole b1 =

(z; 1) ;
 
pR; 6
	
and
b2 = f(0; 5) ; (z; 6)g ; where 1 < z < c; constitutes a Nash equilibrium at which rm 1 is the price-
setter and rm 2, despite being a non-price-setter, produces with units whose marginal costs exceed
p (in particular, q2 = 5 whereas c2(5) = c > z = p), thus failing to satisfy Proposition 1.
Second, the conditions that guarantee existence of competitive equilibria are more stringent in
the irregular than in the regular cases (Proposition 2). On the one hand, the fact that all rms but
one can exhaust competitive demand does not guarantee that the equilibrium will be competitive,
as the net-buyers face incentives to deviate by reducing the price rather than by increasing it. On
the other hand, neither the existence of several price-setters implies that the equilibrium must be
competitive, nor the existence of a unique price-setter implies that the equilibrium must be non-
competitive. To see this, consider again the market structure described above. The strategies
b01 =

(z; 5) ;
 
pR; 6
	
and b02 = f(z; 6)g generate a Nash equilibrium in which both rms are price-
setters and still p = z > 1 = pc: This equilibrium hinges on a property which holds more generally
18
under the irregular cases, namely, that it is not possible to rule out payo¤-relevant ties at the margin.
Whereas the net-buyers weakly prefer to tie so as to avoid productive losses, the net-sellers might
be capacity-constrained to benet from the increased demand they would face if they were to break
the tie by reducing their bids.
Third, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium bidding must now take into account
not only that deviations up and deviations down might be protable, but also that the candidate
stop-out price can be above, equal or below the competitive price. At an equilibrium with p  pc;
condition 3) in Theorem 1 has to be strengthened so that NPSj (p
)  PSj (pj ) holds, not only for
all rms j 6= i with pPSj (b j) > p (as in the regular cases), but also for all rms j 6= i which satisfy
xi + xj > q

i + q

j . In words, the modied condition 3) requires that deviations by non-price-setters
with prot-maximizing prices below p be ruled out, but only when the deviant remains a net-buyer
after deviating to a lower price. To see this, note that the quantity sold by the deviant after a price
reduction would at least be equal to qi   xi + qj ;24 so that a rm with xj  qi   xi + qj would
become a net-seller and hence would no longer benet from lowering the price. Similar arguments
explain why an equilibrium with p  pc requires NPSj (p)  PSj (pj ) to hold for all j 6= i with
pPSj (b j) < p
; but also for all j 6= i satisfying xi + xj < qi + qj .
Fourth, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes pervades the irregular cases. As in the regular
cases, some of this multiplicity can be avoided by appealing to Pareto dominance arguments. In
example above, both b and b0 are Nash equilibria in which rm 1 is a price-setter. But prole b
(which generated a Nash equilibrium in which Proposition 1 failed to hold) is Pareto dominated
by prole b0; which satises Proposition 1. The net-buyer (rm 2) is trivially better-o¤ under b0
than under b as both generate the same stop-out price while rm 2s productive losses are lower. In
turn, since this implies that the net-seller (rm 1) produces more; rm 1 is also better-o¤ under b0
as compared to b. Nevertheless, there is still some remaining multiplicity among equilibria which
cannot be Pareto ranked (as we illustrate below by means of an example).
Finally, there is one last feature that also distinguishes the irregular from the regular cases.
Namely, in contrast to Proposition 3, equilibria in which the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs
may fail to exist under the irregular cases, given that marginal cost bidding exacerbates rms
conict of interests. As compared to the case in which the non-price-setters bid above marginal
costs, marginal cost bidding by the non-price-setters makes it easier for an over-contracted rm to
set a low price: it reduces the amount of output that it has to bid below marginal costs in order
to drive the stop-out price below the competitive one, rendering such a deviation more attractive.
Since rms with fewer contracts may nd it protable to set a much higher price, an equilibrium in
which the non-price-setters bid at marginal costs may thus fail to exist.25
To illustrate some of the features discussed above, we conclude this section by extending the illus-
24At prices below p; rm i would at most sell xi: Hence, in order to become a price-setter at a lower price, rm j
would have to at least produce the quantity it was producing before the deviation, qj ; plus the output that rm i is
no longer producing, which is at least equal to qi   xi:
25Since there is complete information, Equilibrium existence can nevertheless be guaranteed .by appealing to Renys
better reply security (see Corollary 5.2 to Theorem 3.1 in Reny (1999)): due to the e¢ cient tie-breaking rule, bidders
payo¤s are secure and their sum is upper semi-continuous, so that an equilibrium always exists. Note further that
existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium follows from Corollary 14 to Theorem 6 in Jackson and Swinkels (2005) as
the multi-unit uniform-price auction analyzed here satises assumption 8in their paper (see page 122).
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trative example presented in Section 3 (two symmetric rms with costs cn = f(0; 1) ; (1; 2) ; (2; 3)g ;
n = 1; 2, facing inelastic demand, D = 3). Since qcn = 1:5, let x1 = 0 < x2 2 (2; 3] to allow
for a (relevant) irregular case to emerge.26 Focusing on Pareto undominated Nash equilibria, the
following bid prole generates a continuum of equilibria parametrized by the stop-out price, which
is determined by the rst (second) step in rm 1s (rm 2s) bid function. More precisely, we claim
that the following bid prole constitutes a Nash equilibrium,
b1 =

(z; 1) ;
 
pR; 3
	
and b2 = f(0; 2) ; (z; x2) ; (2; 3)g ;
where z 2 [2 (3  x2) ; 2]. Since D = 3; the resulting outcome is q1 = 1 > x1; q2 = 2 < x2 and
p = z 2 [2 (3  x2) ; 2]; rm 1 is net-seller and price-setter, and rm 2 is net-buyer and non-price-
setter (note that rm 2 is marginal as it is bidding one step at z; but it is not dispatching it).
Equilibrium prots are
PS1 (b) = z and 
NPS
2 (b) = z [2  x2]  1:
To check that rm 1 is best-responding to b2; note that for any strategy b01 resulting in p 2 [0; z] ;
it prots are p  PS1 (b) = z; alternatively, if b01 results in p > z; rm 1s prots are bounded
below by 2 [3  x2]  PS1 (b) = z. Consider rm 2 now. For any strategy b02 resulting in p < z;
rm 2s prots are p [3  x2]   3; since rm 2 would become a net-seller, 3   x2  0; it does not
gain by lowering the price, i.e., p [3  x2]   3  z [3  x2]   3  NPS2 (b) = z [2  x2]   1; with
strict inequality if z < 2: If b02 results in p = z; rm 2s production and prots are identical to those
under b2. Finally, if b02 results in p > z; the losses on its net-position increase, thus rendering it
unprotable.
The equilibria constructed above yield a continuum of prices p = z 2 [2 (3  x2) ; 2] : They are
thus not outcome equivalent despite the fact that rm 1 is the price-setter under all of them. They
arise because rm 2, which is a net-buyer, strategically bids at z so as to cap the price set by
rm 1, by o¤ering some of its output below marginal costs. These equilibria might result in prices
below, at or above the competitive price, and might also involve productive ine¢ ciencies by the
non-price-setter (i.e., there is a second source of productive ine¢ ciency on top of the price-setter
withholding protable production). Such multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, which is reminiscent
of Wilsons results, only arises in the presence of forward contracts.
Interestingly enough, the solution is continuous in the amount of contracts held by rm 2, which
enlarge the set of equilibrium prices: when x2 ! 2; p = 2 is the unique equilibrium price (which
coincides with the one reported in Section 3 for x2  2), while when x2 = 3; any price p 2 [0; 2] can
be sustained in equilibrium. Last, one cannot derive a general Pareto ranking among the multiple
equilibria: the price-setter is strictly better-o¤ at the equilibrium with the highest price (whose
outcome is the same as when the non-price-setter bids at marginal costs); however, that is precisely
the worst equilibrium from the non-price-setters point of view.
To conclude, whereas under the regular cases any potential multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes
must derive from the coexistence of equilibria in which di¤erent rms act as price-setters, the
26Even though x2 2 [1:5; 2] would also belong to the irregular cases, in Section 3 we already showed that at the
unique equilibrium outcome, both rmsnet-positions have the same sign and hence face no conict of interests.
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No Contracts END 2 GWs END 5 GWs IB 6 GWs IB 8 GWs
Price-setter IB END IB END IB END IB END IB END
Peak load 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 * 50.0 50.0 * 50.0
75% 11.2 15.0 11.2 *11.6 11.2 * * 15.0 * 15.0
50%  15.9 *5.2 *10.7 *5.2 *  15.9  15.9
25% 23.4 23.6 23.4 23.6 23.4 * 23.4 23.6 23.4 23.6
Table 2: The impact of forward contracts on markups p
 pc
p in the Spanish electricity market during
2005
Note on Table 2: The table reports the simulated mark-ups p
 pc
p for four demand levels (the years peak
load, and the 75%, 50% and 25% demand percentiles). The results are divided in columns, depending on
the identity of the price-setter. A table entry is left empty if, for the associated demand level and contract
volumes, there is not an equilibrium in which such a rm behaves as price-setter. An asterisk denotes that
the equilibrium has changed with respect to the no-contracts case.
irregular cases lead to a continuum of equilibria even when conditioning on the identity of the price-
setter. Some of these equilibria might involve allocative ine¢ ciencies due to either monopoly or
monopsony power, but they might also lead to productive ine¢ ciencies that cannot be ruled by
Pareto dominance. From a policy point of view, the analysis of the irregular cases again points out
at a similar conclusion as the one above, but for a di¤erent reason: more is not always better since
an increase in contract volume widens up the range of ine¢ ciently low price equilibria. Furthermore,
an increase in some rmsforward contracts commitments above their competitive output implies
that the regulator loses all control as to which equilibria will be played, therefore running the risk
that a particularly welfare detrimental equilibrium will be chosen.
7 Simulating the Impact of Forward Contracts
We next apply the theoretical model to simulate equilibrium bidding behavior and market outcomes
in the Spanish electricity market during 2005. The aim is to illustrate with real data the strategic
e¤ects of contracts that we have described in Section 5. Appendix B contains details on the Spanish
electricity market as well as on the procedures we have followed to compute rmsmarginal costs.
We have considered alternative scenarios regarding total contract volume and its distribution
across rms. In particular, focusing on the equilibria in which only the two main rms (Endesa and
Iberdrola) are price-setters, we have computed both the competitive as well as the equilibrium market
outcomes under the no-contracts case and the cases in which either Endesa (END) or Iberdrola (IB)
hold contracts, ranging from 1 to 8 GWs.27
27Since the simulations are conducted on an hourly basis over a year, there are at least 8,760 and at most (if both
rms act as price-setters) 17,520 equilibrium market outcomes under each of the 17 cases considered, plus the 8,760
competitive outcomes (these are the same regardless of whether rms hold contracts or not)- adding up to over 300,000
simulated market outcomes in total. Simulations have been produced by ENERGEIA, a simulation software developed
by the authors.
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Contracts by Min Max
ENDESA (GWs)  Payments
1 -84 -107
2 -143 -194
3 -377 -410
4 -457 -577
5 -439 -608
6 -456 -632
7 -548 -639
8 -709 -654
Contracts by Min Max
IBERDROLA (GWs)  Payments
1 -24 -78
2 -54 -161
3 -88 -222
4 -117 -280
5 -181 -379
6 -200 -434
7 -169 -437
8 -171 -437
Table 3: The impact of forward contracts on total payments to producers (Million e) for the Spanish
electricity market during 2005
Note on Table 3: Total payments to producers under the competitive outcome are 9,599 Me; the minimum
value under the no-contracts case is 11,422 Me, while the maximum is 11,728 Me. The table reports how these
gures change when forward contracts are introduced. Given that there might be multiplicity of equilibrium
outcomes, the Min and the Max columns report the minimum and maximum change in total payments.
Table 2 reports the markups that result from comparing the simulated equilibrium price to the
price that would arise in a competitive market (as suggested in Borenstein et al. ( 2002)).28 Markups
are computed at four demand levels (expressed in percentiles), under the no-contracts case and under
the cases in which Endesa has contracted either 2 or 5 GWs, and Iberdrola has contracted either 6
or 8 GWs (results for all other cases are qualitatively similar). By comparing the markups across
rms at the no-contracts case (rst two columns in Table 2), we can readily verify that Endesas
prot-maximizing price exceeds that of Iberdrolas for all demand levels considered, except for peak
load, at which both prot-maximizing prices coincide.
Let us rst consider the e¤ects of contracts when awarded to the rm with the high prot-
maximizing price, Endesa. First, contracts may reduce Endesas prot-maximizing price as a price-
setter; this is, for instance, the case when Endesa contracts 2 GWs and demand is at its 75% or
50% percentile. Second, contracts may give rise to a new equilibrium in which Iberdrola sets a
lower price; this is the case when Endesa contracts either 2 or 5 GWs and demand is at its 50%
percentile. Last, contracts may eliminate certain equilibria at which Endesa sets the price; this is
the case when Endesa contracts 5 GWs for all demand levels. Therefore, contracts by Endesa have
(weakly) pro-competitive e¤ects.
However, such a conclusion is reversed when contracts are awarded to the rm with the low
prot-maximizing price, Iberdrola. More specically, contracts by Iberdrola have (weakly) anti-
competitive e¤ects when they destroy the low-price equilibrium outcomes. This is the case when
Iberdrola contracts either 6 or 8 GWs and demand is at its 75% percentile.
28We have chosen to report these markups rather than prices for clarity. Nevertheless, note that both markups and
prices illustrate identical results to the extent that the competitive price is the same regardless of which rm sets the
price and regardless of the level of contracting.
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The e¤ects of contracts reported so far vary with the demand level. For example, whereas at very
high or very low demand levels contracts barely have any e¤ect on equilibrium outcomes, their e¤ect
for intermediate demand levels can go in either direction depending on contract volume and contract
allocation. In real markets, since demand changes over time while contract volumes remain xed,
the overall e¤ect of contracts will depend on the relative occurrence of periods in which contracts are
either pro-competitive or anti-competitive. Therefore, with illustrative purposes, we have assessed
the e¤ect that contracts would have had on the Spanish electricity prices during 2005 by computing
total payments to producers over the year.
Table 3 reports the change in total payments when contracts are introduced. Given that there
may be multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes depending on which rm sets the price, we have reported
the minimum and the maximum change in payments. Under all contract cases, total payments to
generators go down, thereby indicating that the pro-competitive e¤ects of contracts seem to dominate
over the anti-competitive ones. However, the anti-competitive e¤ects can also be inferred from these
gures as they account for the non-monotonic relationship between payments to producers and
total contract volume. For instance, such non-monotonicity arises when Iberdrolas contracts are
increased above 6 GWs, when savings are reduced from 200 Me to either 169 Me or 171 Me.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of forward contract commitments (or more generally,
the impact of exogenous vertical commitments) on the performance of spot markets in a model that
tries to capture the essential institutional and structural features of electricity markets. Instead of
assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition, we have tried to model the actual market rules
that govern most electricity markets in practice. In particular, we have assumed that rms compete
by submitting step functions to the auctioneer, who then sets prices and dispatches production in
increasing price order. Furthermore, we have put no restrictions on the market demand function
- which could be either downward-sloping or price-inelastic,- or the rmscost functions - which
could result in either constant or step-wise increasing marginal costs, and could be symmetric or
asymmetric across rms. Thus, the model is exible enough so as to make it comparable with other
more stylized models, at the same time as it allows for all degrees of complexity. Indeed, we have
used it to simulate real electricity market outcomes in order to provide an order of magnitude for
the model predictions.
We nd that forward contracts play a key role in shaping equilibrium market outcomes. To start
with, forward contracts determine the set of weakly-dominated strategies, thus potentially ruling
out equilibria that would exist without contracts, or giving rise to new equilibria that only exist
with contracts. Indeed, we show that the e¤ects of contracts on equilibrium existence are crucial.
If contracts are awarded to rms with strong incentives to exercise market power (i.e., typically
the large rms and/or those facing relatively ine¢ cient rivals), forward contracts may destroy the
equilibria at which such rms set prices. Since the surviving equilibria involve lower prices, forward
contracts are unambiguously pro-competitive. However, the contrary occurs if contracts are awarded
to rms with weak but yet some market power. In particular, contracts might destroy the low price
equilibria, and hence have anti-competitive e¤ects. Allocating contracts to rms with no market
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power has no e¤ects on equilibrium existence, and it is thus irrelevant as far as market outcomes are
concerned. The e¤ects of contracts on equilibrium existence also suggest that more is not always
better. That is, if an increase in contract volume destroys the equilibrium at which the contracted
rm sets the price, more contracts might lead to higher prices.
From a policy perspective, our analysis thus implies that forward contracts should be awarded
in ways that align all rmsinterests by (virtually) reducing their asymmetries. Paradoxical though
it may seem, it is as important to mitigate the large rmsincentives to increase prices as it is to
enhance those of the smaller competitors. This could be achieved by encouraging the medium to
small rms in the industry to act as counterparts of the forward contract commitments imposed
on the dominant producers. Similarly, restricting certain rms from entering into these contracts
can be misplaced.29 Regarding contract volume, forcing rms to hold too few or too many forward
contracts might be at best ine¤ective. Since the optimal contract volume ultimately depends on
rmscost structures and demand, it should be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Extending these conclusions to the analysis of vertical integration would imply that vertical
mergers involving large upstream competitors would be pro-competitive, while vertical mergers
involving smaller upstream rms might be anti-competitive, particularly so when the merging party
is a large downstream rm.
We have focused on exogenously given contracts since we believe, in line with Bushnell et al.
(2008), that many vertical arrangements [in electricity markets] are better understood and can
reasonably be considered to be exogenous.Still, a further step of the analysis would be to allow for
more general types of contracts by investigating the incentives to sign new contracts and hence their
endogenous distribution across rms. The current paper provides the needed rst step to perform
such an analysis.
To conclude, even though our analysis has been inspired by the workings of electricity markets, we
believe that its implications have broader applicability. Since the most relevant features of our model
are not unique to electricity markets, similar analyses could be applied to other contexts. Indeed,
there are several other markets in which forward contracts and auctions coexist (e.g. Treasury
markets, gas markets, etc.), or markets which are organized in ways that make auction theory useful
for understanding rmsstrategic behavior (Klemperer (2003)).
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Appendix
Notation
The following pieces of notation are used throughout the Appendix. We will denote by q
n
(p) the
maximum quantity that rm n can produce at marginal costs strictly below p; and by qn(p) the
maximum quantity that rm n can produce at marginal costs not exceeding p: Formally,
q
n
(p) = max fq : q 2 [0;Kn] and cn (q) < pg ; and
qn(p) = max fq : q 2 [0;Ki] and cn (q)  pg :
Since the marginal cost curve, cn(q); is a left-continuous non-decreasing step function, by treating
all production units with equal marginal costs as the same unit we can write it as a nite number of
cost-quantity pairs, cn =
n
(cns; qns)
~sn
s=1
o
with cns+1 > cns; qns+1 > qns and qn~sn = Kn. Since qn (p)
and qn(p) are on the corners of rm ns marginal cost function, the following properties trivially
follow:
(i) q
n
(p) and qn(p) are non-decreasing in p:
(ii) q
n
(p) = qn(p) = qns for all p 2 (cns; cns+1] :
(iii) q
n
(p) = qns 1 < qn(p) = qns for p = cns:
(iv) q
n
(p0)  qn(p) for all p0 > p:
Since marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, the maximum quantities that a rm can pro-
duce either below or at marginal costs are non-decreasing in p; (i). If p does not intersect the rms
marginal cost function (or equivalently, if it falls on a vertical segment), then q
n
(p) and qn(p) are
equal, (ii). Otherwise, q
n
(p) < qn(p); with p reecting the marginal costs at which the rm produces
the quantities in (qns 1; qns] ; (iii). Last, when comparing qn (p
0) and qn(p) at di¤erent prices p0 > p;
note that q
n
(p0) exceeds qn(p) whenever there is a step in rm ns marginal cost function in between
p0 and p; and they are both equal otherwise, (iv). These results are illustrated in Figure 5.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE]
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) Let us x the bid functions submitted by rms other than n at b n;
and assume rm n follows the strategy b^n; under which there is at least one step to the right of
xn at prices below marginal costs. For the sake of exposition, but without any loss of generality,
let us assume that this happens at only one step ~s such that xn  qn~s 1. Next, we show that b^n
is weakly-dominated by the strategy b0n; which replicates b^n except for quantities in (qn~s 1; qn~s] as
these are now o¤ered at marginal costs. Let b^ (respectively, b0) denote the bid prole

b^n; b n

(respectively, (b0n; b n)). We rst note that the equilibrium price under b^ is no larger than under
b0 as b^n  b0n while b n is the same under both proles. Consequently, p^  p0:30 Trivially, if either
30There is a knife-edge case with downward-sloping demand in which p^ > p0: This only occurs if demand cuts
aggregate supply generated by b^ at p^n but does not intersect aggregate supply generated by b0; so that the price falls
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p^ = p0  p^n~s 1 or p^ = p0  p^n~s+1 hold, the two strategies give rm n the same prots. We focus next
in the remaining possibilities. If demand is price-inelastic, we must have p^ < p0 and q^n = q0n > xn;
if demand is downward-sloping, we have p^  p0 and q^n > q0n > xn. Prots at the two proles are
given by
n
 
b0

=

q0n   xn

p0   Cn
 
q0n

+ nxn and
n

b^

= [q^n   xn] p^  Cn (q^n) + nxn:
Thus,
n
 
b0
  n b^ = q0n   xn p0   p^  Z q^n
q0n
[p^  cn(z)] dz > 0;
as either q^n = q0n so that the integral is zero while [q0n   xn] [p0   p^] > 0; or q0n < q^n so thatR q^n
q0n
[p^  cn(z)] dz < 0 as p^ < cn(q) for all q > xn and hence for q 2 (q0n; q^n] while [q0n   xn] [p0   p^]  0:
Since prots under b0 are no smaller than under b^, the statement follows.
(ii) Let us x the bid functions submitted by rms other than n at b n; and assume that rm
n follows the strategy b^n; under which there is at least one step to the left of xn at prices above
marginal costs. Compare the prots made by rm n under b^n and b0n; with the latter constructed
as above, i.e., it replicates b^n except for quantities in (qn~s 1; qn~s] ; with qn~s  xn; as these are now
o¤ered at marginal costs. The equilibrium price under b^ is no smaller than under b0 as b^n  b0n while
b n is the same under both proles. Consequently, p^  p0: If p^ = p0  p^n~s 1 or p^ = p0  p^n~s+1
holds, the two strategies give rm n the same prots. Since p^ = p0 = p^n~s cannot hold, the only
remaining possibility is p^ = p^n~s > p0 so that xn  q0n > q^n if demand is downward-sloping and
xn  q0n = q^n if demand is price-inelastic. Thus, unless demand is inelastic and it happens to be
such that xn = q0n = q^n so that prots under the two strategies are identical, the di¤erence in prots
at the two proles is
n
 
b0
  n b^ = [xn   q^n] p^  p0+ Z q0n
q^n

p0   cn(z)

dz > 0;
as either the integral is strictly positive or the second term, [xn   q^n] [p^  p0] ; is strictly positive.
Since prots under b0 are no smaller than under b^, the statement follows.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since we must show qj  qj(p); assume by contradiction that there is an
equilibrium at which some rm j; j 6= i; for which qj < qj(p) holds. As there is a nite number of
bid-points, there exists ^ > 0 such that there are no price-bids in the interval (p   ^; p) : Pick an
 < ^ and consider the deviation by rm j of moving the original bid for quantities in

qj ; qj (p
)
i
down to p   : Let the resulting bid prole, denoted by b0 =
n
b1; ::; b
0
j ; ::; bN
o
; generate a stop-out
price p0; and a quantity q0j for rm j: Since q
0
j > q

j (the deviants quantity replaces part of rm is
marginal output), the di¤erence in rm js prots is given by:
j
 
b0
  j (b) = p0   p q0j   xj+ Z q0j
qj
[p   cj(z)] dz:
down to the price at the previous step. In this case, however, the strategy b^n is weakly dominated by one that moves
the price for quantities in (xn; q^n~s 1) above marginal costs so that there is market clearing and hence a new price that
exceeds p^; as claimed.
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There are two cases to consider: (a) If p0 = p   , then the di¤erence in prots is positive: the
second term of the above equation is positive by denition of q
j
(p) as p > cj(q) for any positive
q < q0j  qj (p) ; whereas the rst term can be made arbitrarily small by taking  small enough.
(b) If p0 = p; the deviant now sells the additional output q
j
(p)  qj at a price above its marginal
costs and thus gets more prots. Since the deviation is protable, we reach a contradiction which
proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 3. To show qj  qj (p) for all j 6= i; assume for the sake of contradiction that
there is some rm j for which qj > qj (p
) holds in equilibrium. By weak-dominance arguments,
it must be the case that qj  xj as it could not otherwise bid below marginal costs to dispatch
qj > qj(p
). It hence follows that qj > xj su¢ ces for q

j  qj (p) to hold. To show that qj = xj
or qk < qks for some marginal rm k; k 6= j; are also su¢ cient conditions to ensure qj  qj (p), let
qj (p
) < qj  xj : Consider the deviation by rm j of moving the original bid(s) for quantities in
A; qj
i
above p (e.g. rm j could bid such quantities at marginal costs). The di¤erence in rm js
prots is given by:
j
 
b0
  j (b) = p0   p q0j   xj+ Z qj
q0j
[cj(z)  p] dz: (5)
If qks < qk let A = q

j   [qks   qk] : At the resulting bid function prole b0 the stop-out price
remains p as js dispatched output under b is replaced by rm k, so that q0j < q

j . Consequently,
the rst term in equation (5) is zero while the second is strictly positive (the deviant now reduces its
output and therefore its losses), so that j (b0) > j (b) : Since the deviation is protable, we have
reached a contradiction as desired.
If qks = qk for all marginal rms k; k 6= j; but qj = xj let A = qj   qj (p) : Now, rm js
deviation implies a price increase, p0 > p; thus implying that the rst term in equation (5) may
be negative. However, as we can rewrite equation (5) as the sum of two integrals, recalling that
qj = xj ; it follows that
j
 
b0
  j (b) = Z q0j
xj

p0   p dz + Z xj
q0j
[cj(z)  p] dz =
Z xj
q0j

cj(z)  p0

dz > 0;
since cj(z) > p0 for all z 2

qj (p
) ; qj
i
and hence for z 2
h
q0j ; xj
i
: The deviation is again protable,
reaching a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1. We must show that qj 2
h
q
j
(p); qj(p)
i
for any non-price-setter rm
j: By appealing to Lemma 2 it follows that qj  qj(p) holds. Similarly, if qj > xj or if qk < qks for
some marginal rm k; k 6= j; then qj  qj(p) follows from Lemma 3. Thus qj 2
h
q
j
(p); qj(p)
i
as
claimed.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) We rst show that if D (pc)  mini
P
j 6=i qj (p
c) holds, then at
any Nash equilibrium p = pc: Assume, by contradiction, that p > pc: Since p must be set by at
least one rm, assume that rm i is a price-setter. By Lemma 2,
P
j 6=i q

j 
P
j 6=i qj (p
) ; so that
qi = D (p
) Pj 6=i qj  D (p) Pj 6=i qj (p) : Furthermore, sincePj 6=i qj (p) Pj 6=i qj (pc) ; then
qi  D (pc)  
P
j 6=i qj (p
c)  0; contradicting that rm i is a price-setter. Since p = pc; it follows
that qn = qcn for all n; by Proposition 1:
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(ii) [Only if ] Assume, by contradiction, that there is a unique price-setter, while p = pc and
qn = qcn for all n hold: Note that by denition of pc; it must be the case that pc  cn (qcn) : For all
the rms that are not marginal such a condition is satised with strict inequality, pc > cn (qcn) ; so
that qcn = qn (p
c). Moreover, there must be at least one marginal rm for which such a condition is
satised with equality, pc = cn (qcn) ; so that q
c
n < qn (p
c) as we have ruled out the cases under which
there is no supply rationing at the competitive outcome. Two possibilities can emerge.
1. Firm i is the unique marginal rm. Hence, pc = ci(qci ): Firm i can protably deviate by
bidding its marginal output up to pc + ; for  small enough so that there are no other bids in
(pc; pc + ) : Such a deviation is trivially protable, pc = ci(qci ) implies that it was making no prot
out of the marginal output.
2. Both rms i and j are marginal. We cannot have pc = cj

qcj

= ci (q
c
i ) ; as both rms
would be partly dispatching their marginal steps, which contradicts the fact that there is only one
price-setter. Hence, let cj(qcj) < ci (q
c
i ) : If p
c = cj(q
c
j) < ci (q
c
i ) ; rm i would be selling q
c
i at a price
below marginal costs, which is ruled out by weak-dominance. Alternatively, if cj(qcj) < p
c = ci (q
c
i ) ;
both rms must be dispatching their marginal steps as demand would not otherwise be covered,
D (pc) =
P
j 6=i qj (p
c) + qci . The contradiction proves our claim.
[If ] If there were more than one price-setter while p > pc; then qn  qn (p) for all n must
hold by Lemma 2. Since q
n
(p)  qn(pc)  qcn; then qn  qcn for all n. If for at least one of them
qn > qcn holds, then D(p) 
P
n q

n >
P
n q
c
n = D(p
c); an impossibility. Consequently, qn = qcn for
all n: However, qn = qcn and p > pc can only hold simultaneously when qn = qn(p) = qn(pc) = qcn
for all n; so that rms are not rationed at the competitive outcome. A possibility which has been
nevertheless ruled out.
Proof of Lemma 4. To show (i), recall that qj  qj(p) holds for all j 6= i by Proposition 1.
Since p  pc; then q
j
(p)  q
j
(pc) as q
j
in a non-decreasing function of p: Consequently, NPSj (p
)
is an increasing function of p as qNPSj (p
)  qcj > xj :
(ii) Since p  pc; then qNPSj (p)  qcj  qPSj (p); with strict inequality if p > pc. Thus,
NPSj (p
)  PSj (p) =
Z qNPSj (p)
qPSj (p
)
[p   cj(z)] dz  0;
as p  cj(qNPSj (p)):
Proof of Theorem 1. [Only if ] Suppose that there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium b in
which rm i sets the price at p = pPSi (b i)  pc and rmspayo¤s are PSi (p) and NPSj (p);
i; j = 1; :::N; j 6= i: If this is the case then Condition 1 follows from Proposition 1 and optimal
behavior by the price-setter, and Conditions 2 and 3 follow trivially from the denition of Nash
equilibrium.
[If ] To show that no rm prots by deviating from strategies that satisfy Conditions 1 to 3,
consider rst the non-price-setters j; j 6= i: By Condition 1, they do not want to change their quantity
given p: Thus, the only relevant deviations are those that allow the rm to become the price-setter
at a price above p. Deviating to a price equal to or lower than p is not protable as by Lemma
4, NPSj (p) is increasing in p and 
NPS
j (p)  PSj (p). Hence, those rms j with pPSj (b j)  p will
trivially not deviate. Those rms j with pPSj (b j) > p
 will not deviate as NPSj (p
)  PSj (pPSj )
holds by Condition 3. Last, by Condition 1 the price-setter is already maximizing its prots over
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its residual demand, so that any deviation by rm i must imply becoming a non-price-setter at a
lower price, p < p; while increasing its production to qNPSi (p). Such deviation is not protable by
Condition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We rst prove part (ii). Let b^ and b0 be two equilibrium bid proles such that that under b^ all
rms j bid at marginal costs (i.e., b^ i = c i) while rm i sets the price at p = p^; whereas under b0 at
least one rm j, j 6= i does not bid at marginal costs while rm i sets the price at p = p0. Trivially,
if p^ = p0 both equilibria are outcome-equivalent as prices are the same and rmsj 6= i quantities
must also coincide since they must satisfy Proposition 1. If p^ > p0 then any non-price-setter prefers
b^ to b0 as shown in Lemma 4. This is also the case for the price-setter: if p0 = pc; the price-setter
prefers p^ to p0 by revealed preference, as it could have chosen to also bid at marginal costs to set
the price at pc; but it chose to set p^ > pc instead; if p0 > pc; then
PSi

p^; b^ i

 PSi

p0; b^ i

= PSi
 
p0; b0 i

;
where the rst inequality follows from the fact that p^ is an equilibrium under b^ which requires that
p^ 2 argmaxp PSi

p; b^ i

; and the second equality from the fact that p0 is an equilibrium under b0
so that Proposition 1 holds and hence qj
 
p0; b0 i

= qj

p0; b^ i

= qj (p
0; c i) for all j 6= i so that
qi
 
p0; b0 i

= qi

p0; b^ i

: Since all rms are better-o¤ at b^ = (b^i; c i), it is the Pareto-dominant
one, as claimed.
If p^ < p0; we show next that p0 is also an equilibrium under b^: For the sake of contradiction
assume it is not so that one of the three conditions in Theorem 1 must fail to hold. Since rms
j 6= i bid at marginal costs, they are trivially producing optimally conditionally on being non-price-
setters; furthermore, given that the non-price-setters do not want to become the price-setter under
p^; p^ < p0; the same must hold true under p0 so that Condition 3 of Theorem 1 is satised. As p0 is
an equilibrium under b0 then for any p  p0 such that Pn qn(p; b0 i) = D(p),
PSi
 
p0; b0 i

= PSi

p0; b^ i

 NPSi
 
p; b0 i

= NPSi

p; b^ i

;
where the rst equality and second inequality follow from the fact that p0 is an equilibrium under
b0 (so that Conditions 1 and 2 in Theorem 1 hold) and the last equality from the fact that the
non-price-settersprots are independent of their rivalsstrategies. Hence, since this implies that
Condition 2 of Theorem 1 does also hold, it must then be the case that p0 =2 argmaxPSi

b^ i

, so
that
PSi

p^; b^ i

> PSi

p0; b^ i

= PSi
 
p0; b0 i
  PSi  p^; b0 i :
where the last inequality from the fact that p0 2 argmaxPSi
 
b0 i

: Thus, PSi

p^; b^ i

> PSi
 
p^; b0 i

or equivalently, Z qi(p^;b^ i)
qi(p^;b0 i)
[p^  ci(z)] dz > 0:
However, integral above cannot be positive. If qi
 
p^; b0 i

= qi

p^; b^ i

; integral above is zero.
If qi
 
p^; b0 i

> qi

p^; b^ i

; because some bidder j bids units above marginal costs, then p^ 
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ci(qi
 
p^; b0 i

) implies that the integral is negative. (c) Finally, if qi
 
p^; b0 i

< qi

p^; b^ i

then some
bidder j bids units below marginal costs at b0 i. Since such units are dispatched under b^ i bidding
them below marginal costs is ruled out by weak-dominance so that qi
 
p^; b0 i

< qi

p^; b^ i

cannot
hold in equilibrium. Since integral above cannot be positive we ran into a contradiction proving
that p0 > p^ must also be an equilibrium when rms j bid at marginal costs as it satises the three
conditions in Theorem 1. Last, by the same arguments as above, the equilibrium with p0 Pareto
dominates the equilibrium with p^:
We now prove (i). The [If ] part is trivial, so we omit it. [Only If ] For the sake of contradiction,
suppose that the equilibrium in which rm i is the price-setter at p = pPSi (c i) while all other
rms bid at marginal costs does not exist. This must be because Condition 3 fails to hold, given
that Conditions 1 and 2 trivially hold. If there is multiple prot-maximizing prices any other price
p 2 argmaxPSi (c i) < pPSi (c i) would also violate Condition 3, given that pPSi (c i) is assumed
to be the largest one. To show that there does not exist any other equilibrium in which rm i
is the price-setter, argue by contradiction and suppose that some other bid prole b0 constitutes
an equilibrium. If p0 < pPSi (c i) then Condition 3 will again fail to hold contradicting that it
constitutes an equilibrium, whereas if p0 > pPSi (c i) then p
0 must also be sustainable when the
non-price-setters bid at marginal costs as shown in (ii). The contradiction proves the claim.
Proof of Corollary 1. For ease of exposition, let us index rms by their prot-maximizing
prices when rivals bid at marginal costs, i.e., pPSn (c n)  pPSn+1 (c n+1). We prove this result by
constructing a bid prole that always constitutes an equilibrium, in which rm 1 (i.e., the rm with
the highest prot-maximizing price) is the price-setter. Assume that rms j 6= 1 bid at marginal
costs while rm 1 uses strategy b1 constructed as follows: any q1 < x1 is bid in at marginal
cost, whereas quantities q1  x1 are split into two sets, quantities q1 2 (x1; ~q1) are all bid in
at pPS1 (c 1) where ~q1 = inf

q : c1(q1)  pPS1 (c 1)
	   x1; and quantities q1 2 (~q1;K1) are bid in
at marginal costs. Trivially, the equilibrium price under the proposed prole equals pPS1 (c 1) :
Note that a price p > pPS1 (c 1) is impossible since at any such price p all rms are bidding at
marginal costs; similarly, if p < pPS1 (c 1) rm 1 dispatches no more than x1; implying that rm
1s prots would be less than x1, but PS1
 
pPS1
  PS1 (pc)  x1 given that x1 < qc1: Now, since
p = pPS1 (c 1) and qj = q
NPS
j (p
) for all j 6= 1, Condition 1 of Theorem 1 holds. Condition 2
also holds since if rm 1 deviates to become a non-price-setter, the price would go down to pc; and
NPS1 (p
c) = PS1 (p
c)  PS1
 
pPS1

: Finally, Condition 3 follows from the denition of pPS1 (c 1) as
pPS1 (c 1)  pPSj (c j) for all j 6= 1.
Proof of Corollary 2. Assume that the equilibrium in which rm i is the price-setter exists so
that NPSj
 
pPSi
  PSj pPSj  for all j 6= i. Since by Lemma 4, the non-price-settersprots are
increasing in p; it follows that NPSj
 
pPSi n
  NPSj  pPSi  for any n = 1; ::; i   1: Consequently,
NPSj
 
pPSi n
  NPSj  pPSi   PSj pPSj  implies that the equilibria in which rms f1; :::; i  1g are
the price-setters also exist. The remaining part of the proof follows the reversed arguments.
Proof of Lemma 5. Part (i) follows from the fact that pPSn (x) is equal for all n; it constitutes
the unique equilibrium price, and it is (weakly) decreasing in x. As x approaches qc; productive
e¢ ciency is (weakly) greater because rmsmarket shares converge and marginal cost functions are
(weakly) increasing.
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To prove part (ii), suppose that contracts are not identically distributed among rms, x1 < x2 
:::  xn; so that x1 <
P
n xn
N = x: Since all rms are symmetric in all other respects, p
PS
1 (x1) 
pPSj (xj) for all j 6= 1; furthermore, existence of an equilibrium with pPS1 (x1) is guaranteed by
Corollary 1. When contracts are identically distributed, the highest equilibrium price is pPS1 (x) :
Since for x1 < x; pPS1 (x1)  pPS1 (x), the highest equilibrium price is (weakly) higher if contracts
are not identically distributed. It follows that productive e¢ ciency at the highest price equilibrium
is (weakly) lower under any asymmetric contract distribution.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let us rst introduce the following piece of notation. For xn  xj = 0;
let x0n be the smallest amount of contracts held by rm n for which the equilibrium in which rm n
sets the price does not exist. Formally,
x0n  min

xn : xn 2 [0; qcn] and NPSj
 
pPSn (xn)

< PSj
 
pPSj (0)

for some j
	
:
(i) By construction, pPS1 (0) is the highest candidate equilibrium price at the no-contracts case,
and Corollary 1 guarantees that it is an equilibrium price. Since pPS1 (x1) is weakly decreasing in x1;
the highest equilibrium price when x1 > 0 is max

pPS1 (x1) ; p
PS
2 (0)
	  pPS1 (0) : Hence, the highest
equilibrium price is (weakly) higher at the no-contracts case. To show that the lowest equilibrium
price is also (weakly) higher at the no-contracts case, let pPSi (0) be the lowest equilibrium price
when x1 = 0: By Corollary 2, any price pPSn (0)  pPSi (0) ; for 1 < n  i; must also be an equilibrium
price when x1 = 0 as well as when x1 > 0. The incentives of all rms other than rm 1 do not
depend on x1, whereas rm 1s incentives to deviate from an equilibrium in which rm n sets the
price are decreasing in x1; hence, if no rm deviates from pPSn (0) when x1 = 0; no rm will deviate
either when x1 > 0. It thus follows that the lowest equilibrium price when x1 > 0 can not be larger
than pPSi (0) : Therefore, since the set of equilibrium prices is the same when x1 = 0 or x1 > 0,
except (possibly) for the highest price, which is higher when x1 = 0, and the lowest(s) price(s)
which is (possibly) lower when x1 > 0; contracts by rm 1 only (weakly) reduce prices.
Let us now show that there can exist a non-monotonic relationship between contracts awarded
to rm 1 and equilibrium prices. Since pPS1 (0) is an equilibrium price when x1 = 0, while when
x1 = q
c
1 it is not (since p
PS
1 (q
c
1)  pc < pPS2 (0), rm 2 would trivially deviate from such a low price),
there exists x01 2 (0; qc1] such that the equilibrium with pPS1 (x1) does not exist for all x1 2 [x01; qc1] :
Let pPSj (0) be the lowest equilibrium price when x1 = x
0
1: By Corollary 2, it must be the case that
pPS1 (x
0
1) < p
PS
j (0) as otherwise p
PS
1 (x
0
1) would also be an equilibrium. Thus, if p
PS
1 (x1) is close
enough to pPS1 (x
0
1) for x1 slightly below x
0
1; then equilibrium prices go up as x1 approaches x
0
1: Note
that such non-monotonicity need not always arise, e.g., if for x1 slightly below x01; pPS1 (x1)  pPSj (0) :
(ii) Let us allocate all contracts to rm i. Since pPSi (0) is the lowest equilibrium price at the
no-contracts case, by Corollary 2, equilibrium prices are

pPS1 (0) ; :::; p
PS
i 1 (0) ; p
PS
i (0)
	
. Existence
of x0i 2 (0; qci ] is guaranteed by monotonicity, since pPSi (0) is an equilibrium price while pPSi (qci ) 
pc < pPS1 (0) is not (rm 1 would trivially deviate from such a low price). Now, as p
PS
i (xi) is
non-increasing in xi, allocating contracts xi 2 (0; x0i) to rm i leads to (weakly) lower prices as
compared to the no-contracts case, as equilibrium prices are

pPS1 (0) ; :::; p
PS
i 1 (0) ; p
PS
i (xi)
	
and
pPSi (0)  pPSi (xi). However, allocating contracts xi 2 [x0i; qci ] yields to (weakly) higher prices, as
equilibrium prices are

pPS1 (0) ; :::; p
PS
i 1 (0)
	
and pPSi (0)  pPSi 1 (0). Note that allocating contracts
xi to rm i does not give rise to new equilibria in which rms n > i set prices, as at least rm 1
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would deviate from such equilibria. It follows that there exists a (weak) non-monotonic relationship
between contract volume and equilibrium prices when contracts are awarded to rm i.
Similar arguments would imply that if all contracts are awarded to some rm 1 < n < i;
there exists x0n 2 (0; qcn) such that equilibrium prices are

pPS1 (0) ; :::; p
PS
n (xn) ; :::; p
PS
i (0)
	
for
xn < x
0
n and

pPS1 (0) ; :::; p
PS
n 1 (0) ; pPSn+1 (0) ; :::; pPSi (0)
	
for xn  x0n. Contracts xn < x0n thus lead
to (weakly) lower prices, but the e¤ect of contracts xn  x0n depend on which equilibrium is chosen,
given that pPSi (0)  pPSn (0)  pPS1 (0) :
(iii) Since for n > i; pPSn (0) is not an equilibrium price at the no-contracts case, it follows that
x0n = 0: Consequently, for any xn  0; pPSn (xn)  pPSn (0) ; so that by Corollary 2, pPSn (xn) cannot
be sustained in equilibrium. Hence, prices remain the same as in the no-contracts case.
B Details on Simulations
The Spanish electricity market is organized similarly to many other wholesale electricity markets
around the world. In particular, most transactions take place through an organized exchange,
that operates on an hourly basis according to the rules described in Section 2 (see Crampes and
Fabra (2005) for more details). The market structure is highly concentrated, with the two largest
rms - Endesa and Iberdrola - controlling almost 60% of total thermal capacity, more than 80% of
total hydro capacity, and approximately 40% of total renewables. Even though the shares of these
technologies on total production vary across years, in 2005 hydro and renewables contributed to
cover 8% and 11% of total demand, respectively. Table 4 summarizes the market structure of the
main generators in the Spanish electricity market.
In order to conduct the simulations, we have rst computed rmsmarginal cost curves following
similar techniques as in previous papers (Fabra and Toro (2005)).31 In particular, we have estimated
each thermal units marginal production costs on a daily basis, taking into account the type of fuel it
burns, the cost of the fuel, the plants heat rate (i.e., the e¢ ciency rate at which each plant converts
the heat content of the fuel into output), the short-run variable cost of operating and maintaining
it, and the costs of its CO2 emissions. In addition, for coal plants, we have added an estimate of
the costs of transporting coal from the nearest harbor where it is delivered to the plant where it is
consumed. Lastly, each units generation capacity has been reduced by its estimated outage rate.
By aggregating the capacities of each rms thermal units in increasing marginal cost order, we have
obtained estimates of rmsthermal marginal cost curves for each day of the year.
Furthermore, we have assumed that the marginal costs of producing electricity with hydro and
renewables equal zero. The production coming from such sources has therefore been added to the
left of each rms thermal marginal costs curve in order to construct their overall marginal costs
curves. We have chosen not to use actual data on hydro production, as it is already the result of
rmsstrategic decisions. Instead, poundage hydro generation has been set to peak-shave demand
on a monthly basis, taking into account maximum hydro ows.32 Both, run-of-river hydro as well as
31The data used in the simulations have been obtained from various sources, including The National Energy Com-
mission (CNE), Red Eléctrica de España (REE), OMEL and UNESA.
32As it is by now well understood (Bushnell (2003)), rms could strategically shift hydro from peak to o¤-peak
hours, thereby distorting the e¢ cient use of hydro resources. A full analysis of this issue is out of the scope of this
section. However, despite assuming competitive bidding for hydro units, hydro still a¤ects rmsstrategic decisions
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Firm/ Technology Nuclear Coal CCGT Oil-Gas Total Shares
Endesa 3,511 5,511 1,170 1,779 10,918 33%
Iberdrola 3,222 1,225 3,704 3,050 8,456 26%
Unión Fenosa 702 1,946 1,559 747 4,954 15%
Gas Natural   2,729  2,729 8%
Hidrocantábrico 155 1,549 390  2,094 6%
Others  909 2,144 731 3,784 11%
Table 4: Installed Thermal Capacity (MWs) by Firm and Technology in the Spanish Electricity
Market, 2005 (Source: REE)
renewablesproduction, have been uniformly spread across time. Hydro stocks, run-of-river hydro
ows, and renewable energy, are monthly estimates of a representative year.
Demand has been assumed to be price-inelastic at the actual hourly demand levels that were ob-
served in 2005. Furthermore, we have set the market-reserve price at 120e/MWh, below its explicit
180e/MWh level, with the aim of reecting issues such as the threat of entry or regulatory inter-
vention. Nevertheless, setting this cap at either 120 or 180e/MWh does not change the qualitative
nature of the results.
through its impact on their inframarginal output.
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Figure 1: Forward contracts by rm 1 and equilibrium prices (asymmetric rms (55%,45%))
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Figure 2: Forward contracts by rm 2 and equilibrium prices (asymmetric rms (55%,45%))
Note: In Figures 1 and 2 we have assumed N = 2: There are 200 units, 2 at each marginal cost level,
k = 1; :::; 100; each owned by a di¤erent rm. Firm 1s units have capacity 1:10 while rm 2s units
have capacity 0:9. Demand is price-inelastic, D = 70; so that pc = 35 and qc1 = 38:5 > q
c
2 = 31:5:
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Figure 3: Forward contracts by rm 1 and equilibrium prices (asymmetric rms (60%,40%))
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Figure 4: Forward contracts by rm 2 and equilibrium prices (asymmetric rms (60%,40%))
Note: In Figures 3 and 4 we have assumed N = 2: There are 200 units, 2 at each marginal cost
level, k = 1; :::; 100; each owned by a di¤erent rm. Firm 1s units have capacity 1:20 while rm 2s
units have capacity 0:8. Demand is price-inelastic, D = 70; so that pc = 35 and qc1 = 42 > q
c
2 = 28:
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Figure 5: An example of a rms marginal cost function and the quantities q
n
(p) and qn(p)
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